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MOSHE MA’OZ
The Role of the Temple Mount / Al-Haram Al-Sharif 
in the Deterioration of Muslim–Jewish Relations
For both Jews and Muslims the Temple Mount and the Old City of Jerusalem constitute highly import­ant religious, cultural, political and national cen­
tres. For centuries Jews in the diaspora prayed in the 
direction of Jerusalem, vowed never to forget it (‘If I 
forget thee Jerusalem, may my right arm wither’); and 
blessed one another ‘Next year in Jerusalem’. The Zion­
ist­Jewish movement (since the 1880s) – although pre­
dominantly secular – has considered Jerusalem (Zion) 
as the political and cultural centre of the Jewish people.
 By comparison, the Palestinian­Arab national move­
ment has, since the 1920s established its national and 
political­cultural centre in East Jerusalem, while the 
Haram al Sharif, particularly the Al­Aqsa Mosque, has 
continued to be a top religious shrine for Muslims. They 
termed it Awla Al-Qiblatayn  (the first prayer direction 
before Mecca);  Thani Masjidayn  (the second mosque 
after Mecca); a place where Prophet Muhammad 
ascended to heaven (Isra’ and Mi’raj).
 This article will examine the changes in Muslim–
Jewish mutual relations, especially since 1967, at both 
government and public levels. Special attention will be 
given to the development of both Islamic Judeophobia 
and Jewish Islamophobia, which have been associ­
ated with the dispute over the Temple Mount and East 
Jerusalem .
Introduction
For the last 47 years, on 5 June, many Jews in Israel 
and abroad have celebrated the military victory 
known as the Six Days War (1967) and the ‘liber ation’ 
of East Jerusalem and the Temple Mount. For Jews 
this euphoric occasion meant a return to the Temple 
Mount (Har HaBayit in Hebrew) after more than 
2,000 years of exile.
By contrast, millions of Muslims around the 
world, and especially in Palestine, mourn this event 
as a historical trauma and an immense naksa (defeat). 
For them the conquest of East Jerusalem (Al-Quds 
Al-Sharif) and the Al-Haram Al-Sharif by the Jews 
occurred after more than 1400 years of Muslim rule 
(with the exception of the Crusader conquest).
For both Jews and Muslims the Temple Mount 
and the Old City of Jerusalem are hugely important 
religious, cultural, political and national sites. For 
centuries Jews in the diaspora prayed in the direc-
tion of Jerusalem, vowed never to forget it (‘If I for-
get thee Jerusalem, may my right arm wither’; Psalms 
137:5), and blessed one another with ‘Next year in 
Jerusalem ’. The Zionist-Jewish movement (since the 
1880s) – although predominantly secular – has con-
sidered Jerusalem (Zion) to be the political and cul-
tural centre of the Jewish people.
By comparison, the Palestinian-Arab national 
movement established its national and political-cul-
tural centre in East Jerusalem in the 1920s, while Al-
Haram Al-Sharif, particularly the Al-Aqsa Mosque, 
has continued to be a foremost religious shrine for 
Muslims. They called it Awla Al-Qiblatayn (the first 
prayer direction before Mecca), Thani Masjidayn (the 
second mosque after Mecca), and Isra’ and Mi’raj (the 
place from where Prophet Muhammad ascended to 
heaven; Al-Qur’an 2:144; 17:1).
Failing to acknowledge the particular sanctity of 
this shrine for Islam and overwhelmed by its spec-
tacular military victory and the historic magnitude 
of this event, the Israeli government decided in June 
1967 to annexe East Jerusalem to West Jerusalem; and 
in July 1980 the Knesset (Israel’s parliament) passed a 
law to this effect. However, Israel also granted control 
of the Temple Mount to the authority of the Jordan-
ian waqf (religious trust) . Since then, many Israeli 
governments have rejected requests by Muslim lead-
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ers, largely Palestinians, for sovereignty over East 
Jerusalem and the Temple Mount. Israeli govern-
ments have declared them to be ‘disputed’ places.
Furiously reacting to the Israeli occupation of the 
Haram, East Jerusalem and other Arab territories, 
many Muslim political and religious leaders called 
for a jihad (holy war) to ‘liberate’ these sites. Period-
ically, Muslims have used violence against Israeli 
and Jewish targets, causing severe bloodshed and 
destruction. These leaders have employed not only 
anti-Zionist, but also anti-Semitic language in their 
campaigns against Israel. A major case in point was 
at a special conference held at the Al-Azhar Academy 
in Cairo, 1968, attended by hundreds of Muslim reli-
gious leaders, arriving from most parts of the Arab 
and the Muslim world (Al-Azhar 1968: passim).
By contrast, a growing number of Jews, particu-
larly in Israel, developed an Islamophobic attitude, 
partly in reaction to Muslim Judeophobia and partly 
as a rejection of the Muslim claim to the Temple 
Mount. This hostile attitude has persisted with the 
backing of Jewish rabbis and with little interference 
from Israeli authorities. All this has transpired despite 
the gradual development of pragmatic, conciliatory 
approaches by Arab and Muslim leaders since the 
late 1970s (excepting revolutionary Iran and militant 
Muslim groups).
This article will examine the changes in Muslim–
Jewish mutual relations, especially since 1967, at both 
governmental and public levels. Special attention will 
be given to the development of both Islamic Judeo-
phobia and Jewish Islamophobia, which have been 
associated with the dispute over the Temple Mount 
and East Jerusalem. But, first, this should be placed 
within a brief historical perspective.
Changes in Muslim–Jewish relations and the issue  
of Jerusalem
For many centuries, including under Ottoman-Mus-
lim rule (1453–1918), the Jews were considered as Ahl 
Al-Kitab (‘People of the Book’), or Ahl Al-Dhimma 
(‘Protected People’) by the Muslim state; being only 
partial believers, they were given an inferior politic al 
and judicial status compared with Muslims. They had 
to pay jizya (poll tax; Al-Qur’an 9:29, 5:60) and suf-
fered other legal and social restrictions. From time 
to time Jews were subject to acts of oppression and 
violence by fanatic rulers and the mob. However, by 
and large they were tolerated by Muslims and largely 
cooperated with them in commerce, the arts and 
sciences, and the like. For long periods Jews occu-
pied senior positions in government administration 
and the economic life of the state. Like Christians, 
Jews were granted communal autonomy within the 
millet (nation, community) system and in personal 
matters, as well as in education, religious worship 
and other social and cultural issues. On the whole, 
Jews were treated better than their Christian fellow 
subjects since they were mostly loyal to the Muslim 
Northeast exposure of Al­Aqsa Mosque on the Temple Mount, in the Old City of Jerusalem. 
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(Ottoman) state, whereas Christians were suspected 
of collaborating with hostile European powers. Fur-
thermore, for centuries Jews under Islamic rule were 
much safer than their brethren in various Christian 
countries, where they were frequently persecuted 
and subjected to great humiliation and violence 
(pogroms, for example). These anti-Jewish attitudes 
reflected Christian anti-Semitism.
On the other hand, with a few exceptions, Jews 
in Muslim lands did not experience anti-Semitism. 
As the noted scholar of Islam, Bernard Lewis, wrote 
in 1984: 
One important point should be made right 
away. There is little sign of any deep rooted 
emotional hostility directed against Jews … 
[in Muslim lands…] such as the anti-Semitism 
of the Christian world. There were, however, 
unambiguously negative attitudes. These were 
in part the ‘normal’ feelings of a dominant 
group towards a subject group, with parallels in 
virtually any society. (Lewis 1984: 32)
Indeed, Jews in Muslim countries used to occa-
sionally praise the Islamic state for its benevolent 
treatment, while aspiring to the destruction of ‘evil’ 
Christianity. For example: ‘God did not bring along 
the Kingdom of Ishmael only in order to rescue Jews 
from the evil one (Christendom)’; ‘The Kingdom 
of Ishmael is moderate’… ‘is a benevolent kingdom’ 
(Lazarus-Yaffe 1968: 268). Yet, one significant but 
rare exception to this Jewish Islamophile attitude 
was articulated by the great Jewish Rabbi and scholar 
Maimonides (d. 1204), who labelled the Kingdom 
of Ishmael ‘the most hateful nation towards Jews’ 
(Iggeret Teyman 1952: 98–9; Stillman 1979: 241). 
Apparently he referred to the Al-Mohads rulers who 
harshly persecuted Jews in the mid-twelfth century 
and possibly forced Maimonides to temporarily con-
vert to Islam.
Another rare anti-Islamic expression by a Jew-
ish Rabbi, Rahamim Falaji, in nineteenth century 
Izmir, related to a mosque (the Al-Aqsa) in Jerusa-
lem, hinting in his prayer at a wish for the destruc-
tion of this mosque (BZ Kedar, Haaretz, 7.8.2009). 
As with Maimonides’ assertion, Falaji’s uncommon 
expression by no means reflected the attitude of most 
Jews toward Islam and its holy shrines in Jerusalem. 
On the contrary, Jews were extremely grateful to the 
Ottoman-Muslim state for absorbing hundreds of 
thousands of Jewish refugees who were fleeing from 
the Spanish-Christian inquisition in the late fifteenth 
century. Jews were also grateful to the Ottomans 
for permitting them to settle in Palestine, notably 
in Jerusalem: by the year 1800 Jews in Jerusalem – 
many of them non-Ottoman subjects – numbered 
some 2,000 people, among 9,000 inhabitants; and in 
1914 – 45,000 of 70,000 (Parfitt 1987: 33–8). Further-
more, the Ottoman authorities allowed Jews to pray 
at the Western Wall, but not on the Temple Mount. 
The Ottomans also protected Jews in Jerusalem and 
elsewhere against periodic harassment by local Mus-
lim zealots (Cohen 1976: passim; Grajewsky 1977: 
112–16). During the nineteenth century the Otto-
man authorities protected Jews against a newly-
emerging form of anti-Jewish sentiment on the part 
of local Christians; namely anti-Semitism. This new 
phenomenon was manifested in a series of ‘blood 
libels’ against Jews in the region, particularly in 
Damascus in 1840. Such accusations, inspired by 
old European-Christian anti-Semitism (including 
the Dreyfus Affair) were intermittently employed by 
some Ottoman Christians against their religious and 
economic Jewish rivals. It is possible that they were 
aiming to destroy their Jewish enemies while trying 
to forge a common agenda with their Muslim neigh-
bours against the alleged Jewish crimes. As it turned 
out, some Muslims in the region were influenced by 
this new trend and from time to time used the ‘blood 
libel’ weapon against Jews (Frankel 1997: passim; 
Levi 1994: 40). 
The impact of the Arab–Zionist conflict
A turning point occurred with the advent of the Zion-
ist-Jewish movement and its enterprise in Palestine 
since the late nineteenth century, which included the 
purchasing of Arab land and, indirectly, evicting Arab 
peasants. Gradually more and more Christians and 
Muslims developed not only an anti-Zionist attitude, 
but also anti-Semitic sentiments (although some 
did distinguish between Zionists and Jews). Some 
Christian Arabs expressed these hostile positions in 
order to forge a common Arab nationalist stance with 
Muslim Arabs. Jerusalem constituted a major venue 
for such cooperation, with Muslims and Christians 
in Jerusalem even signing an anti-Semitic petition 
(Mandel 1976: 39, 49, 51, 55). With the appearance 
of the Palestinian-Arab national movement, Muslims 
assumed a major role in the anti-Zionist anti-Semitic 
current. Indeed the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, Hajj 
Amin Al-Husayni, during the 1920s and 1930s, was 
the major leader of this trend, as well as the head 
of the Palestinian National Movement. He used the 
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Temple Mount/Al-Haram Al-Sharif issue as a vehicle 
for his pan-Islamic and pan-Arab campaign against 
Jews and Zionists. Fomenting anti-Jewish riots, he 
demanded from the British mandatory authorities 
that they prohibit Jewish prayers at the Western Wall 
(Al-Buraq), which Muslims considered to be part of 
the Al-Aqsa Mosque. He and other Muslim leaders 
also alleged that the Jews were conspiring to destroy 
the Temple Mount Mosque and rebuild their ancient 
temple (Porath 1976: 201). These allegations and 
other Muslim actions, together with Jewish reactions, 
led to the bloody 1929 riots, starting at the Western 
Wall and spreading throughout Palestine.
Following the 1929 riots, the Mufti convened a 
pan-Islamic congress in Jerusalem (1931) with the 
aim to promote solidarity, support and defence for 
Al-Aqsa and Al-Buraq. Subsequently, monetary con-
tributions were made by Muslim organizations to 
renovate the Al-Aqsa Mosque and construct the Al-
Aqsa University.
The issue of the Haram Al-Sharif also continued 
to engage the Mufti and the Palestinian National 
Movement during the Arab-Palestinian rebellion 
(1936–9) against the British and the Jews. The Mufti, 
leader of the ‘Holy Jihad’ group, was deeply involved 
in this rebellion. He was also imbued with Nazi anti-
Semitism and expressed his adoration of Hitler. Dur-
ing World War II he cooperated with the 
Nazis and found refuge in Berlin dur-
ing the period 1941–5. He coordinated 
campaigns with Hitler and other Nazi 
leaders against the British ‘oppressors’ 
in Palestine as well as against the Jews. 
At his request Nazi leaders ‘promised 
to destroy the Jewish national home in 
Palestine and engage in the battle against 
world Jewry’ (Mattar 1988: 99, 105).
The Mufti endeavoured to spread 
his anti-Semitic views among Palestin-
ian Arabs, particularly the youth (the 
‘Nazi Scouts’). Nonetheless, a sizable 
Palestinian opposition, led mainly by 
the notable Nashashibi family, did not 
share the Mufti’s views. Many of them 
opted to coexist and to cooperate with 
the Jewish Zionist movement, particu-
larly in Jerusalem .
Indeed, the mainstream of the Zion-
ist (secular) movement also sought coex-
istence and cooperation with the Arabs. 
It did not aspire to dominate the Temple 
Mount and rebuild the Jewish temple, 
but only to control the Western Wall as a historic al 
national symbol. Hence, Dr Haim Weizmann, a 
prominent leader of the Zionist Movement, signed 
an agreement with Prince (later King) Faysal (son of 
Husayn, Sharif of Mecca) in January 1919. Although 
the agreement was never implemented, article VI 
reads as follows: ‘The Mohammedan [Muslim] holy 
places [in Jerusalem] shall be under Mohammedan 
control’. Weizmann and other Zionist leaders also 
publicly denied (in 1928 and 1931) any Jewish inten-
tion to dominate or blow up the mosques on the 
Temple Mount (Laqueur and Rubin 1991: 68–72).
Significantly, in 1937 and 1947 the Zionist move-
ment even accepted (albeit reluctantly) two plans for 
the partition of Palestine, whereby Jerusalem would 
not be under its control at all. The first was the Brit-
ish Peel Commission Report (1937), suggesting 
that Jerusalem should be under British control; the 
second was the Partition Resolution of the United 
Nations (1947), which assigned ‘a special interna-
tional regime for the city of Jerusalem (including the 
holy places)’ (ibid. 48–9, 95–8).
On the other hand, Jewish radical leaders – reli-
gious and secular alike – not only wished to control 
the Western Wall, but also to rebuild the Ancient 
Temple. Public photos were displayed of Jews hold-
ing Zionist flags with the Star of David next to the 
The men’s side of the Western Wall. 
Patrick Brennan, 2008. Creative Commons BY-2.0
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Dome of the Rock Mosque. Militant Jews also dem-
onstrated in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, chanting anti-
Arab and anti-Muslim slogans, calling for the return 
of the Western Wall into Jewish hands (Porath 1976: 
214–15). Furthermore, radical right-wing secular 
Jews even plotted to ‘liberate’ the Wall by military 
force and to blow up the mosques. Among them was 
the Revisionist movement Beitar (and later in 1947 
the Stern Gang), as well as a few former members of 
Haganah (a mainstream underground organization).
Nevertheless, the Beitar youth movement ignored 
the pragmatic approach of the Zionist leadership 
toward the Western Wall issue. Inspired by Rabbi 
Kook, then Chief Rabbi, and in reaction to the Mus-
lim hostile presence at the Wall, Beitar initiated a 
major demonstration there on 15 August 1929. As a 
response Muslims demonstrated the following day, 
chanting that Al-Aqsa and Al-Buraq belonged to 
them, and burnt Jewish prayer books at the Wall. This 
critical event led to a vicious cycle of violent riots and 
killings in Jerusalem, Hebron, Safed, Tel Aviv and 
elsewhere, claiming the lives of 137 Jews and 116 
Arabs.
Other cycles of Arab–Jewish violence and killing 
– not directly related to Jerusalem – were initiated by 
militant Palestinian nationalists during the 1936–9 
rebellion against both the British and the Jews. In 
reaction to Palestinian terrorist actions, the right 
wing Irgun (another underground organization) also 
conducted terrorist operations against non-combat-
ant Arabs (such actions were repeated in late 1947 
and early 1948). However, the mainstream Haganah 
was relatively more restrained.
During the 1948 Arab–Israeli war, the Temple 
Mount did not play a major role in the Palestinian-
Zionist conflict. Only King Abdallah of Jordan made 
great efforts to protect the Haram Al-Sharif and the 
Old City of Jerusalem against potential Israeli attacks. 
Israel’s Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion did not 
initiate any military moves to take control of East 
Jerusalem and the Temple Mount. Jerusalem was not 
mentioned at all in Israel’s Independence Charter in 
May 1948. In 1949 West Jerusalem was proclaimed as 
Israel’s capital and until the 1967 war Israel avoided 
taking any steps to take East Jerusalem and the 
Temple Mount. Israel periodically filed complaints to 
the UN against Jordan for denying Jewish access to 
pray at the Western Wall. This was a breach of article 
VIII of the Jordanian–Israeli Armistice Agreement of 
1949.
The Temple Mount and the Dome of the Rock, one of the most important religious sites in the Old City of Jerusalem. 
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1967: the turning point
As indicated above, in the aftermath of the June 1967 
War, the Muslim–Jewish conflict over the Temple 
Mount/Al-Haram Al-Sharif was revived, greatly 
enhancing manifestations of Muslim Judeophobia 
and Jewish Islamophobia in the region. Thus, the 
critical historical change in the status of the Temple 
Mount, East Jerusalem and other occupied territories 
ignited among Muslims feelings of despair, vengeful-
ness and religious solidarity. In particular, conserva-
tive and zealous Muslims deepened their ideological 
religious attachment to Al-Haram Al-Sharif, elevat-
ing its importance and vowing to liberate it by means 
of a jihad against their Jewish enemies. Similarly, 
many Jews in Israel and abroad were deeply moved 
by the recovery of the Western Wall, the symbol of 
their historical national ethos. But among zealous 
Jews, the Messianic longing to rebuild the Temple was 
heightened by the intention to blow up the mosques 
– symbols of Islam – that had ‘desecrated’ the Temple 
Mount. These mutual hostile attitudes have been 
accompanied by denials of each other’s attachment to 
their respective holy shrines.
Vis-à-vis this militant Jewish–Muslim symmetry, 
the political and religious leaders of both sides have 
mostly adopted asymmetric and/or ambivalent posi-
tions regarding these critical issues, partly to advance 
political and national objectives, and partly to please 
their militant groups. Simultaneously, attempts have 
been made by the relevant governments, as well as 
by various global organizations, to settle this dispute, 
but to no avail.
Ambivalent and changing attitudes in Israel:  
manifestations of Islamophobia
The ambivalent positions in Israel regarding the 
Temple Mount in East Jerusalem emerged immedi-
ately after the 1967 war. General Mota Gur, the 
(secular) commander of the paratroopers’ battal-
ion that conquered the Old City, proclaimed at the 
time that ‘[t]he Temple Mount is in our hands … 
also the Western Wall … you paratroopers returned 
it to the nation’s bosom after 2000 years.’ General 
Shlomo Goren, Chief Rabbi of the Israel Defence 
Forces, sounded the shofar (ram’s horn) as a token of 
the Messiah’s return. He also then contemplated the 
destruction of the Haram Mosques and reconstruc-
tion of the Jewish Temple (Reiter 2001: 113–20; see 
also Chen 2010: 29 ff.). Subsequently, East Jerusalem 
was annexed to Israel, and the Maghribi Quarter was 
destroyed in favour of a large square at the Western 
Wall. But, at the order of Moshe Dayan, Israel’s then 
defence minister, no Israeli flags were raised on the 
Temple Mount, and the Muslim (Jordanian) waqf 
authorities were allowed to control and administer 
the site. Jews were permitted to visit this site but not 
to pray there. Israel’s chief Rabbinate had prohib-
ited Jews from visiting the Temple Mount, owing to 
theological-Halachic (Jewish law) injunctions. Other 
notable rabbis stated that such visits and prayers by 
Jews could spark a religious war and a Muslim jihad 
that would result in bloodshed and the deaths of 
many Jews (Reiter 2001: 119).
Other rabbis and a growing number of militant 
Jews – religious and secular alike – have pressured 
Israeli governments to permit prayer on the Mount, 
while several of them, including members of the 
Knesset, have ignored the prohibitions imposed 
by the government and the Chief Rabbinate. Fur-
thermore, growing groups of fanatical Jews such as 
‘the Faithful of the Temple Mount’ and more than a 
dozen Temple Mount organizations have preached 
to destroy the mosques and rebuild the Temple. For 
this very purpose they have prepared designs for the 
Temple and its altar, as well as garments for the priests, 
and they have also tried to raise a red heifer in order 
to use its ashes to purify the Temple. These fanatic al 
groups have been inspired by senior Orthodox 
rabbis , including the Western Wall rabbi (Rabinovich 
and Bronstein 2009: 403). Probably under the influ-
ence of these messianic groups 30 per cent of Israeli 
Jews and 45 per cent of national religious Jews in 
Israel currently support the rebuilding of the Third 
Temple (over the ruins of the mosques), while the 
great majority of Israeli Jews wish to maintain Israeli 
control over the Temple Mount (Reiter 2001: 135). 
Furthermore, various youth groups have periodically 
staged demonstrations at that site, attacking Muslim 
passers-by, and chanting ‘we shall erase Amaleq … 
the Temple will be built – the mosque will be burnt 
… Muhammad is dead … death to the Arabs’ (Kashti 
2014).1 These anti-Muslim and racist anti-Arab 
demonstrations have constituted a major part of the 
Islamophobic trend which has increased since 1967. 
Influenced also by Muslim, Arab and Palestinian ter-
rorism (see below), this trend has been significantly 
expressed both in word and deed. For example, the 
late Rabbi Ovadia Yosef, a former Sephardi Chief 
1 According to the Bible, Amaleq was a deadly enemy 
of the Israelites that must be eliminated, Exodus 
17:14.
66 Approaching Religion • Vol. 4, No. 2 • December 2014 
Rabbi and leader of the Shas party, said in one of 
his weekly sermons (January 2012): ‘Islam is an ugly 
religion … and we should pray for the death of the 
Palestinian Ishmaelites [Muslims]’. In his book Torat 
Ha’Melekh (‘The King’s Teachings’), Rabbi Yitzhak 
Shapira, backed by many others, called for the killing 
of the children of gentiles [Arabs and Muslims] dur-
ing wartime. In March 1994, Dr Baruch Goldstein 
(an American-Jewish-Israeli fanatic) murdered 29 
Muslim worshippers at the main mosque of Hebron. 
Other Jewish fanatics have occasionally killed Arabs, 
damaged mosques and burned copies of the Qur’an 
in the West Bank. In 1984 a Jewish zealot, Yehuda 
Etzion, and his comrades attempted to blow up the 
Mosques on the Temple Mount.2
To be sure, Israeli political and religious leaders 
have strongly denounced these and other Islamo-
phobic crimes, while Israeli courts have sentenced 
several of these Jewish terrorists to prison. Senior 
rabbis have argued that these acts did not represent 
authentic Judaism. A large group of Jewish rabbis 
and Muslim imams issued a warning in 2012 that 
manifestations of ‘anti-Semitism and Islamophobia 
are likely to destroy the entire humanity’. Similarly, 
Yaakov Perry, a former head of Israel’s security ser-
vices, stated in 2013 that ‘if the Jewish militants were 
to sabotage the Mosque, it would mean the end of the 
world … the eruption of a world war between us and 
the Muslim world’.3
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has on 
occasion denounced Jewish atrocities against Mus-
lims. He has also prevented Jewish militants from 
praying on the Temple Mount, reneging on his pre-
vious promises to them. But in September 1996, he 
ordered the opening of an ancient tunnel adjacent 
to the Temple Mount, thus provoking Muslim riots 
and Israeli retaliations. This event claimed the lives 
of many Muslim youths and Israeli soldiers (Reiter 
2001: 117, 162).
Even more critical was the visit of General 
(retired) Ariel Sharon – then leader of the Likud 
opposition – accompanied by hundreds of soldiers at 
the Temple Mount (28.9.2000), with the permission 
of Ehud Barak, the (Labour) PM. This visit provoked 
a long series of violent Muslim riots known as the Al-
Aqsa Intifada, which caused the deaths of hundreds of 
2 Ramon 2003: 336; Haaretz, 9.6.2013; 8.7.2014; 
8.9.2010; 8.12.2010; 29.1.2001; 17.3.2001; The Wash-
ington Post, 2.4.2011.
3 Haaretz, 9.9.2011; 17.11.2011; 30.3.2012; 24.9.2012; 
13.5.2014; Haas 2014.
Palestinian Arabs and Israeli Jews. Millions of Mus-
lims all over the world protested, calling for the lib-
eration of Al-Aqsa and the Haram Al-Sharif (Ramon 
2003: 76, 338). As we will discuss below, several 
Muslim militant organizations assumed the name 
Al-Aqsa in their struggle against Israel. This includes 
also the recent war between Israel and Hamas in 
Gaza (July–August 2014). Hamas flags carry a pic-
ture of Al-Aqsa, and Palestinian children chant ‘we 
shall return to Al-Aqsa’. Many Palestinians protested 
at the Al-Aqsa Mosque against Israeli attacks in Gaza 
(The Algemeiner, 4.8.2014). 
Although cautious to avoid any further provoca-
tion on the Temple Mount, most Israeli governments 
(even before the aforementioned intifada) failed to 
achieve a political settlement regarding the problems 
of the Temple Mount and East Jerusalem, as well as 
other Palestinian territories. In fact, to the contrary, 
all Israeli governments since 1967 have endeavoured 
to Judaize East Jerusalem, including the Old City. 
They have built new Jewish neighbourhoods, thus 
extending Greater Jerusalem further into the West 
Bank, evicting Palestinian residents, destroying Arab 
buildings, and allocating only a small fraction of the 
city budget to East Jerusalem (UN General Assembly, 
Resolution 64/20, 28.1.2010). Most Israeli govern-
ments have proclaimed that Jerusalem will remain 
‘united forever’, reflecting the views of most Israeli 
Jews (80 per cent and 68 per cent of Knesset mem-
bers). About 70 per cent of Israeli Jews support Israeli 
sovereignty over the Temple Mount. A recent reflec-
tion of these positions was seen on ‘Jerusalem Day’ 
in late May 2014, when Prime Minister Netanyahu 
proclaimed that 
Jerusalem was united 47 years ago. It will never 
be divided; we will never divide our heart – the 
heart of the nation. Jerusalem is also Mount 
Zion and Mount Moriah (the Temple Mount), 
the Western Wall – Israel’s eternal. (Haaretz, 
29.5.2014)
Common and diverse Muslim attitudes:  
the growth of Muslim Judeophobia
As indicated above, millions of Muslims around the 
world reacted furiously to the 1967 Israeli occupation 
of the Haram Al-Sharif including Al-Aqsa and the 
Dome of the Rock Mosque, as well as East Jerusalem 
and other Palestinian and Arab territories. Politic al 
(secular) and religious leaders and groups called for 
a jihad to liberate these sites. They expressed not only 
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anti-Zionist but also anti-Semitic positions, both in 
the media and also in textbooks. Among these lead-
ers were Egypt’s presidents Gamal Abdel Nasser 
and Anwar Sadat, the Syrian presidents Hafiz and 
Bashar al-Assad, the Iraqi President Sadam Hussein, 
the Saudi King Faysal, Iran’s leader the Ayatollah 
Khomeini, the Palestinian Chief Yassir Arafat and 
many other Muslim leaders. In 1972 Anwar Sadat 
stated: ‘Jews are a nation of liars and traitors … striv-
ing to control the world’. King Faysal and Mustafa 
Tlas (the Syrian defence minister) referred to ‘blood 
libels’ against Jews, while others mentioned the Pro-
tocols of the Elders of Zion (Ma’oz 2010: 10–11; Fatah 
pamphlet 1969; Radio Cairo, 25.4.1972). The 1973 
war against Israel was termed a jihad by Syrian and 
Egyptian leaders (as it was by Arafat earlier). 
In addition to the 1973 war, Muslim radical groups 
launched numerous attacks against Israeli and Jewish 
targets in various parts of the world (Munich 1972, 
Buenos Aires 1994, Haifa 2003, and many other 
places). Several of these radical groups carry names 
relating to Jerusalem or the Al-Aqsa Mosque, such 
as Iran’s Al-Quds (Jerusalem) force, Egyptian Ansar 
Bayt Al-Maqdis (supporters of Jerusalem), Fatah’s 
Shuahada A-Aqsa (Martyrs of Al-Aqsa). In addi-
tion, Hamas’s TV channel is called Al-Aqsa; and the 
Islamic movement in (northern) Israel, led by Shaykh 
Raad Salah, has used the title Al-Aqsa for most of its 
anti-Israeli and anti-Jewish activities and organiza-
tions. (Nuhad 2013: 155–65; 
Larkin and Dumper 2012: 
31 ff.; Haaretz, 5.3.2014)
On the other hand, 
although condemning the 
continued Israeli occupa-
tion of Haram Al-Sharif 
and East Jerusalem, a grow-
ing number of Muslim lead-
ers and governments have 
maintained either open or 
secret relations with Israel. 
Several of them have also 
suggested a peaceful settle-
ment of the Jerusalem issue. 
Egypt’s President Anwar 
Sadat, on his historic visit 
to Israel in November 1977, 
stated at the Knesset that: 
‘Jerusalem is the crux of 
the matter’ and demanded 
that East Jerusalem and 
the Islamic holy shrines be 
returned to Arab sovereignty as a condition for an 
Arab-Israeli peace. During the negotiations at Camp 
David (1978) and subsequently, he also suggested 
raising an Islamic flag on the Temple Mount, apply-
ing Arab sovereignty to all of the Old City except for 
the Western Wall, and permitting free access to places 
of worship to all believers. Possibly at Sadat’s request, 
the Grand Mufti of Egypt, Ali Jad Al-Haqq, issued 
a special fatwa (religious opinion) in 1979, permit-
ting Egypt’s peace treaty with Israel on the grounds 
that East Jerusalem and the holy places be returned 
to Muslim hands. (Ma’oz 2010: 90 ff.; Reiter 2001: 272 
ff.)4
Israel’s (Likud) Prime Minister Menachem Begin 
initially suggested that the holy shrines be admin-
istered by the various religious communities, that 
the Islamic holy places be managed by a representa-
tive of Arab states, or even become a sort of ‘Mus-
lim Vatican’. However, later, Begin changed his mind 
and insisted on Israeli sovereignty over the entire 
city of Jerusalem. This position was approved by the 
Knesset in July 1980, when a unified Jerusalem was 
proclaimed the eternal capital of Israel. In response, 
Sadat stopped negotiations with Israel concerning 
Palestinian autonomy, and the Mufti of Egypt with-
drew his fatwa.
4 For Sadat’s speech at the Israeli Knesset, see Laqueur 
and Rubin 1991: 389–98.
Looking towards the Mount of Olives from the south side of the Temple Mount where the 
Dome of the Rock is located. 
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The failure of diplomacy
In the Oslo Agreement between the Palestine Liber-
ation Organization and Israel (1993) the Jerusalem 
issue was deferred for at least three years until a per-
manent agreement could be reached. Such negoti-
ations took place only in July 2000, at Camp David, 
and in Taba in January 2001. The PLO then demanded 
full control of the Temple Mount and East Jerusalem , 
but it conditionally accepted US President Bill Clin-
ton’s suggestion to divide East Jerusalem and the 
Old City between Israel and Palestine. Accordingly, 
the Palestinians would have control over the Temple 
Mount and the Old City, and Israel would control the 
Western Wall and a section below the mount, as well 
as the Jewish Quarter. Israel’s Prime Minister at the 
time, Ehud Barak, initially agreed in principle to this 
suggestion, but later changed his mind at Taba and 
agreed only to a special regime for the holy places; 
this without Palestinian sovereignty over the Temple 
Mount, naming it ‘the holy of the holiest (for Jews)’. 
At that stage, Israel still preferred a Jordanian role 
for the Temple Mount; and in the peace agreement 
(September 1994) Israel granted ‘high priority’ to the 
Jordanian historic role at this shrine (Ramon 2003: 
483–4). However, most Arab and Muslim states 
opposed this suggestion, giving priority to the PLO 
and considering the Haram Al-Sharif a Pan-Islamic 
issue.
Significantly, in March 2002 the Arab League (22 
Arab states), backed by all Muslim states (57 mem-
bers including the Arab countries) issued an unprec-
edented peace plan. For the first time it offered Israel 
peace, security and normal relations, provided Israel 
agrees to the creation of a Palestinian State along the 
1967 lines, with East Jerusalem as its capital. This 
peace initiative, originated by Saudi Arabia, has been 
reconfirmed by the Arab League several times since, 
including in 2014, but with no official response from 
Israel.5 Ehud Olmert was the only Israeli prime min-
ister to de facto accept this peace initiative. During 
his negotiations with the Palestinian President Mah-
mud Abbas (2008) he agreed – without his cabinet’s 
approval – to the creation of a Palestinian State along 
the 1967 lines. East Jerusalem would be the capital 
of this state, while the holy shrines of the three reli-
5 Ma’oz 2010: 12–13, 24–5; Haaretz, 29.11.2011, 
24.9.2012; an interview with Saudi Prince, Turki Al-
Faysal in Haaretz, 8.7.2014.
The Western Wall Plaza. 
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gions will be without sovereignty and administered 
by representatives of Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Palestine, 
Israel and the United States. Abbas did not accept 
this unique Israeli offer, and asked for further consid-
erations. Olmert then faced strong domestic opposi-
tion, including from his Defence Minister Barak and 
Foreign Minister Livni, so that he virtually became 
a lame duck. In February 2009 he lost to Netanyahu 
in the national elections. Since then, Netanyahu has 
not responded to the repeated proclamations of the 
Saudi/Arab peace initiative, including a new offer by 
Abbas: namely, that in the framework of peace, the 
Western Wall and the Jewish Quarter would be under 
Israeli control, and there would be freedom of wor-
ship in the Old City. Since 2013, Netanyahu’s third 
government has adopted uncompromising positions 
regarding East Jerusalem and the Temple Mount, as 
well as other Palestinian issues. The nine months of 
negotiation (from July 2013) with Abbas, under the 
mediation of US Secretary of State John Kerry, ended 
in failure. Kerry blamed both parties for this failure, 
but remarked: ‘Israel could become an apartheid state 
if it does not reach peace with the Palestinians’ (New 
York Times, 13.7.2014). 
The Israel–Hamas war, which took place in July–
August 2014, further aggravated Muslim–Jewish 
relations in East Jerusalem and beyond (Al-Monitor, 
15.9.2014). Indeed the radicalization of the Israeli 
government and of the right-wing groups – includ-
ing more manifestations of Islamophobia – has pro-
voked even greater Muslim anti-Semitism among the 
Palestinians (93 per cent) and other Arab and Muslim 
nations (74 per cent) (Jewish Exponent, 15.7.2014). 
Militant Muslims and Jews in Europe also share this 
hatred for one another. For example, Jews in Ger-
many recently protested against the (allegedly larg-
est) Islamic anti-Semitic demonstration which took 
place in Berlin during the Al-Quds March on 25 July 
2014 (Al-Monitor, 27.8.2014). These two dangerous 
trends – Judeophobia and Islamophobia – could well 
lead to a new Muslim–Jewish global war. 
By contrast, an agreed settlement on East 
Jerusalem between the two sides would significantly 
reduce these perilous trends in the region and the 
world over. It would enable Israel to improve rela-
tions with the Arab and Muslim world, as well as the 
international community. To reiterate what Anwar 
Sadat said in his Knesset speech in 1997, ‘Jerusalem 
is the crux of the matter’. Similarly, Ahmad Qurie, 
a senior PLO leader, stated in 2010: ‘Jerusalem is a 
key to peace; it is also a key to war and perpetual 
conflict. There cannot be a solution to the problems 
of the region without first solving the problems of 
Jerusalem ’ (UN Session, Rabat, 2.7.2010). 
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